Abstract: Human capital, access to markets, and innovation-friendly institutions were important preconditions for the acceleration of technological change during the industrial revolution. In this context, the recent literature discusses the role of patents. Given their dual nature, patents may have either stimulated innovation through the creation of financial incentives for inventors or they may have hampered innovation, because they created monopolies that restricted the free flow of knowledge. For this reason, the overall effects of patents on innovation and, eventually, long-run economic growth are not clear. In order to develop a better understanding of the determinants of innovation, this special issue of the Economic History Yearbook therefore focuses on the causes and consequences of patent laws and patent law reforms in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in different European countries.
the accumulation of knowledge and entrepreneurial activity. Typically, clusters of innovation persist over long periods of time. This path-dependency explains why most countries and regions that were among the innovative leaders in the year 1900 have maintained their lead until today and why only few were able to catch up. 2 In this regard, understanding the historic determinants of innovation is essential to get a better understanding of why some countries are rich, while others remain poor. 3 To study the causes and consequences of innovation empirically, economists and economic historians typically rely on patents as a proxy variable. 4 However, it is also albeit consensus that patents do not fully reflect innovation and, more importantly, that there are differences in patent laws. 5 This makes it difficult to use patents in cross-country comparisons of innovation. The latter argument is of particular relevance for the nineteenth century and earlier periods, since there were larger differences in patent laws and less attempts for international harmonization than today. Thus, when studying the socio-economic roots of industrialization and long-run economic growth in international comparison, we should also consider differences in patent laws and their economic consequences. Strong patent laws, for example, may have created incentives for inventive activity and thus increased innovation. 6 Patent laws might have broadened the innovative base of societies by creating a market for innovation that allows indi-viduals to sell their ideas.
7 Without patents, it might have been more difficult for small individual inventors with lacking financial funds to put their ideas into practice. However, patent laws can also affect innovation in the opposite direction by restricting competition and the free diffusion of knowledge. Thus, the overall effect of patent laws on innovation and, eventually, economic growth is ambiguous. The aim of this volume of the Economic History Yearbook is to better understand the causes and consequences of patent laws and patent law reforms in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in different European countries.
Economic historians have drawn most attention on the development of patent laws in England and the United States, and their roles in the process of industrialization. Typically, England is attributed as the country with the first "modern" patent law, in contrast to pre-modern patent and privilege systems, for example in fifteenth-century Venice. 8 The traditional literature highlights the role of the English patent law for the stimulation of inventive activity and, thus, for England's rise to industrial power. 9 However, modern research contests this interpretation by taking a rather patent-critical position. Given its extraordinary high patent fees and a complicated application procedure, there is a discussion whether the English patent system was inefficient and to what extent it provided room for cronyism. 10 In this regard, Mokyr and others point out that many important inventions of the first industrial revolution were not patented at all. 11 In the mid-nineteenth century, England started to reform its patent system, which reflects the fact that the old English patent law was indeed antiquated. By contrast, the literature considers the US patent system as more inclusive because of considerably lower patent fees and a sophisticated tech- nical examination of patent applications.
12 The latter may have ensured a higher degree of legal security than in England, where the lack of examination led to a higher number of patent infringements, and, eventually, higher follow-up costs for legal advice. Thus, the US patent system may have provided a legal environment that was more conducive to innovation and provided an important precondition for the emergence of knowledge-intensive industries during the second industrial revolution.
While the role of patent laws has been discussed intensively for England and the United States, there is less research on other Western economies, even though this situation changed in recent years. Scholars have started to create patent data sets for several European countries including the German Empire, Italy, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.
13 These data sets allow the empirical analysis of innovation and patenting during the nineteenth century. However, only few data sets cover the whole nineteenth century and there are still many open research questions that have not yet been addressed, for example the harmonization of different German and Italian patent laws as a consequence of territorial consolidation and nation-building in the nineteenth century.
This volume provides new perspectives on the emergence of patent laws and their economic consequences. It includes articles on the emergence and reform of patent laws in England, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, and Sweden. Thus, we take a broad perspective that covers two of the industrial forerunners in Europe (England and France), two relative latecomers (Germany and Italy), as well as two smaller countries at the European periphery (Norway and Sweden). The focus of these studies is on the early nineteenth century, the period of the first industrial revolution. Finally, the last article takes a different approach and analyses the effects of patenting practices on competition in England and the United States in the early twentieth century based on several firm-level case studies. In the first article, Sean Bottomley provides an analysis of the English patent law. Bottomley takes a rather "revisionist" view and argues that the English patent system was less inefficient and more inclusive as recent research suggests. In particular, he claims that intellectual property rights in England were rather strong so that patents were valuable assets. These findings contrast with studies from Mokyr and others who argue that it was hard to enforce patent rights before courts and that the patent fees were too costly so that only a small proportion of inventors could afford to file a patent -at least until the reforms of the nineteenth century, when the patent fees were substantially lowered.
14 The second article focuses on France which was among the first countries with a modern patent law. Its 1791 law was based on the idea that inventions were public goods that would only be provided efficiently if inventors were compensated sufficiently. However, the law assumed that the true value of an invention could not be assessed by a third party and therefore refrained from examining an invention's novelty and usefulness. Although the patent system was open for everyone, Gabriel-Galvez Behar argues that the law turned out to be very restrictive because of the system's high patent fees. The patent law reform partially addressed these shortcomings in 1844, but the new patent law did not induce a fundamental change in patenting behaviour.
The following two articles by Alessandro Nuvolari and Michelangelo Vasta as well as Alexander Donges and Felix Selgert analyse the effect of varying patent systems within a broader political unit. Donges and Selgert concentrate on the different patent systems that existed in Germany prior to the legal harmonization in 1877. The article shows the sharp differences of patent laws between the German states, although the Zollverein introduced some common rules in 1842. While some states, like Prussia, had strict examination systems similar to the United States, other states, like Saxony, favoured registration systems such as in France. German patent laws also differed with regard to fees and the ability of foreigners to file patents. These dissimilarities in patent laws translated into considerable differences in the number of registered patents leaving Prussia with by far the lowest number of patents per capita. Therefore, the authors caution against using patent counts in cross-country comparisons of innovation without taking care of legal differences.
In their article on Italy, Nuvolari and Vasta focus on the extension of the 1864 patent law of the Kingdom of Sardinia to the growing Kingdom of Italy. They analyse the harmonization effect in several dimensions including the geographical distribution of patents, the distribution of patents across technologi-|| 14 Cf. Mokyr, Intellectual Property Rights. cal fields, the intensity of use of the system and investment in patent protection. The authors find that the extension of the Sardinian law led inventors from other pre-unitary states to use the patent system more intensively. The harmonization of Italian patent laws furthermore attracted more foreign inventors from more widespread destinations. Finally, harmonization also attracted more investment in patent protection from domestic as well as from foreign inventors.
The next two articles on Sweden and Norway cover the experience of the European periphery. In their article on Sweden Frederik Tell and David Andersson describe the evolution of four different patent laws between 1819 and 1884. They show how early patent laws were more concerned about preventing the creation of technological monopolies and therefore introducing an examination process. Ensuing laws in the 1830s and 1850s, however, oriented more towards English and French legislation by introducing a registration system, but legislation returned to an examination system (inspired by the United States and Germany) in 1884. Over the nineteenth century, Swedish patent laws became more open towards foreigners and succeeded in creating an early market for innovation where it was possible to trade technology. The law of 1856 also created a market for patenting services by obliging foreigners to use Swedish patent agents.
In his article on the Norwegian patent law, Bjørn Basberg describes the evolution of the Norwegian patent law since the early nineteenth century and analyses how international harmonization efforts during the 1870s and early 1880s influenced Norway's patent legislation. He shows how the country learned from the Swedish (1884) and German (1877) patent laws but also incorporated the conventions of the International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property in its 1885 law. Apparently, the 1885 law attracted more foreign patents to Norway, most presumably because compliance with international standards led to an increased trust in the Norwegian patent system. In terms of technology, these patents concentrated in the fields of the second industrial revolution.
In the last article of this issue, Anna Spadavecchia and Peter Scott compare the interaction of patent law and competition policy in the United Kingdom and the United States during the first decades of the twentieth century. The authors examine the effects of so-called fundamental patents (basic patents that were necessary for the production and use of various products) on competition within industries. They show how fundamental patents determined market power and industry structure in the lightbulb, vacuum cleaner, and radio industry. In the absence of effective anti-trust policies, this concentration of market power led to considerable welfare losses.
The articles of this volume share some common insights. Most obviously, there was a process of legal convergence since the 1860s, which we explain with two developments. First, the various German and Italian patent laws gradually disappeared because of legal harmonization reflecting the process of territorial integration and nation-building. Second, states at the European periphery carried out reforms creating patent laws that resembled the patent laws of their bigger, ever more important trading partners. In Sweden, for example, important features of the Prussian patent system were incorporated into the law, for example the requirement of a technical examination of inventions. Eventually, the increasing need for international coordination and standardization lead to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883.
Legal convergence and increasing international coordination reflect the increase in trade and foreign investment during the first globalization. 15 The evidence from Italy and Germany suggests that the harmonization of patent laws fostered inventive activity by decreasing transaction and information costs. However, in international perspective, it is not clear whether the strengthening of international patent law enforcement was indeed beneficial or harmful for the creation of innovation. As one article of this volume shows, big business used patents to create entry barriers and to restrict competition. The international light bulb cartel is one prominent example that illustrates such anticompetitive strategies.
16 Therefore, the overall effect of international patent law standardization needs further empirical investigation. In this regard, the articles of this volume might stimulate future research in economic history. 
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